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I4?P .A!4H ..." - ..

m 'lliE

SUPREM: COURT.

OF 'lliE STATE OF UI'AH

LIZABEI'H WEEKS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

l4
l

vs.
EROlA 1.1<\NSIE CAIDmKJOD,

2

Case No.

15,671

Defendant-Respondent,

8

vs.

8 ONSTANCE E. PATrON ZARBOCK,
Third-Party DefendantRespondent.

5
L2,1!

BRIEF OF DEFENDANI'-RESPOODENI'

ll
STATEMENT OF 'lliE NATURE OF 'lHE CASE

This is an action in tort for personal injuries alleged to have been caused
ll he Plaintiff, Elizabeth Weeks, who was a passenger in the second car of a fourar chain reaction type collision which occurred at the 45th South Northbound on-

3
10

amp to I-15 on February 1, 1974, at approximately 7:30 a.m.

The Appellant claims

hat the Defendant, Cerola Dansie (Calderwood) and Third-Party Defendant, Constance
lizabeth Patton Zarbock negligently caused the injuries canplained of in the Comlaint.

6,7,f

DISPOSITION

m 'lliE I..OOER COURT

The case was tried to a jury in the Third Judicial District Court on December

, 6, and 7, 1977.

The issues were submitted to the jury on a Special Verdict form

nd the jury found that the Defendant, Cerola Dansie (Caldei.V.lOOd) was 100% negligent,

hlch negligence was a proxirmte cause of the Plaintiff's injuries, and assessed
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the am::runt of Plaintiff' s damages at $2, 596 , 42.

The Defendant, Constance

Zarbock was found 0% negligent (R. 228) .

.~

s

I

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Respondent seeks to have the judgioont of the trial court affirmed.

'W

STATEMENl' OF FACl'S

<h the nmning of February 1, 1974, at approximately 7:30 a.m., (Tr. 443)

Appellant, Elizabeth Weeks, was involved in an autorrobile accident while on he
l~BY

to lOOrk.

The accident occurred at the 45th South Northbound on-ramp to I·

in Salt Lake County.

(Tr. 635).

Four cars were involved in the accident, whi

was of the chain reaction collision type.

The last of the four cars, which wwa

,b~

driven by Cerola Dansie (Calderw:xxi), hit the car directly behind Appellant,

car was driven by Constance Patton Za.rbock, and impelled that car into the ca:di'
which Appellant was a passenger.
into a

truck

The car in which Appellant was riding was p~

directly in front of Appellant as a result of the impact frcm

be~
wa:

(Tr. 641-642) .

Appellant in her Amended Canplaint (R., 229-231), claimed damages for in
sustained as a result of the accident against the Defendant, Cerola Dansie (C
and also against the Third-Party Defendant, Constance Patton Za.rbock.

Appell

also claimed special damages and interest on any special damages pursuant to
di1

27-44 U.C.A. (1953, as amended).
The jury found the Defendant, Cerola Dansie (CaldeJ:V.Qod) was 100% negl~
and that her negligence was a proximate cause of the injuries complained of:
Plaintiff.

They found no negligence on the part of the Third-Party Defendan

Constance Patton Zarbock.

The jury awarded $2,596.42 in damages.

Subsequent to the jury being excused, Appellant TIBde a notion for an ad
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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..,t

the grounds that the jury only """""" 'P'Cial """"- and t;>at on "-" of

special damages cannot be made without an award of general damages (Tr. 697 -98) •
In a post-trial IIX>tion, Appellant asked for a new trial (R. 239-40).
lolere

Both IIX>ti.ons

denied.
ARGUMENT ON APPEAL
POINI' I

t43)

ASSUMING WE JURY AWARD WAS FOR SPECIAL DAMAGES ONLY
COUNSEL'S FAillJRE TO OBJECI' WAIVES PJN IRREGUIARI'IY
IN VERDier

\he

) I·

One of Appellant's principle contentions on appeal is that the jury verdict
h w.was for special damages only.
.t,

between special and general damages so it is impossible to know just what the jury
I

• _

-~ -~- ------~"

------·

did award to Plaintiff-Appellant as either general or special damages.

! C8l

LS

The special verdict form did not differentiate

But assum-

ing, as Appellant does, that the award was for special damages only then counsel for
p. --·
Appellant's failure to object to the verdict while the jury was still impaneled,

n be..-------------- . _ .. -- -

"-·

""--~-----~--

waives subsequent objections to any irregularity of the verdict.
~---=---------------- ·---~

Rule 47(r) of the U.R.C.P. states:

r in

(r) Correction of Verdict. If the verdict rendered is informal
or insufficient, it may be corrected by the jury under the advice of
the Court, or the jury may be sent out again.

e (C

pel!

The transcript of record, pp. 697-98, shows that the
jury was
dismissed
imne----~--- -,_ r-..
--

.to

diately following the

n ai

po~!_~

of the jury, to wit:

(POU.ING)
TilE COURT: Thank you, ladies and Gentlanen. You will be excused.
We appreciate your service subject to the next call of the Court and the
verdict will be filed. Thank you very nn.JCh.
MR., M)RGAN: I have a MJtion for RenDval of Evidence I would like
to file. It's just the AMA book and the other book. Rather than have
to worry about corning back for it.
TilE COURT: !my objections?
.
MR. SNYDER: Che matter that I think needs to be taken up at this
time because I am aware of law on the matter, but I' 11 wait until the
jury is through. It needs to be taken up at this time.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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'

'll{Ji; COORl' : Okay.
MR. SNYDER: Your lkmor, I think it's obvious from the finding of
the jury and the answers to the special verdict questions that the jury
awarded the aroount of special damages which were listed on the exhibit
for special damages and that is the exact BIJX>tm.t. There is law to the
effect that you cannot award special damages without awarding general
damages. That's one of the matters that I referred to in the Courtroom.
I think it is my duty, at this time, to make a l!l)tion on behalf, and
I 'WOUld be happy to file it in writing with the Court, if the Court wants
to consider it at a later time. I think I have to make a l!l)tion for the
record for an additur, because· I do not think that you can have a verdict
from a jury that incorporates just special damages.
I think if there are special damages there has to be general damage~
And I think there is law to that effect. And I think it is Utah law. 1!1
happy to brief the subject for the Court, if the Court is concerned; but:nI think I have to make that l!l)tion for jud~t notwithstanding the verdict for an additur.
the
niE OOURl': I am going to ask cotmsel to submit a written l!l)tion an
JDeiiDrandun in connection with it and set it down for a hearing.
bav
MR. SNYDER: Thank you, Your Honor.
(Whereupon this hearing was concluded.) (El:nphasis added.)

--·-

The transcript clearly indicates that cOtmSel for Plaintiff-Appellant diJ
----=-----=~--------·--·
object to the verdict tmtil after the jury had been dismissed.
....

~

~,-_.,_

-~.

'

In both Colm v. J.C. Permey Company, Inc., 537 P2d 306 (Utah, 1975) and'

v. International Transport, Inc., 491 P2d 1211 (Utah, 1971) a similar occurnPla
took place.

The respective juries, in both cases, returned verdicts for thetha

BIJX>tm.t of the Plaintiff' s claimed special damages , but for no general darnages:Jam
in these two instances the verdict forms did provide spaces for both general
special damages).

Subsequent to the verdicts and the dismissal of the juries

cOtmSel for both Plaintiffs filed l!l)tions for new trials .

at :

the

In Colm, the court said:

The verdict was deficient in form, and cotm~l2.! _t§s:l.. an opporttmi!J ilhi'
to have the jl,Iry sent back :f;9:r :i;urther ..delibermQDS. Thi~ .he_ did_210.!= .I .
~§psTearing ~ha~ the jury might e~ther awm:d s~ ~r am:ruru..eg
or even change the verd~ct and award nothing to the Plarnt~ff. It YX>Ulc; .
be a
trial tactic i f he could have had a new trial on damages onlFXP·
before a jury, which ~uld not be acquainted with the weakness of Plain
tiff's cause of action. (At 311-12).

srrart
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l
In Langton., the Court said:

If counsel be permitted to remain Illlte when a verdict is insufficient or infonnal, he gains an unfair strategic advantage.*** '!he
sil~e of Plaintiff's counsel, upon hearing the verdict; is coaprehennble, he could reasonably have concluded that the jury wa8 unsympathet~c to his cause or parsim:mious, and he 1NOUld, of course, prefer
a new Jury. There nust be reasonable rules to control the te:rmillation
of litigation; if counsel has an opporbmity to correct error at the time
of its occurrence and he fails to do so, any objection based thereupon
is waived.· (At 1215).

:xn.
and
anti

the
diet

No one can know precisely what the jury did award Plaintiff in terms of ~1
Bl
butJr special damages or any combination thereof, but assuming, as Appellant does, that

age~

rer-

the award was for special damages only, then counsel's failure to object, so as to

~~

.

bave the jury sent back for deliberations, waives any irregularity in the verdict.
POINr II

:diJ

and·

COURT Nar REQUIRED 'ID DIFFERENTIAlE BE'IWEEN SPECIAL
AND GENERAL DAMAGES ON SPECIAL VERDier FORM

Appellant claims that because the special verdict form did not provide separate

urr!l>lanks for am:runts of general and special damages, it was defective.

Appellant argues

the that, by statute, the Court is required to differentiate between special and general

agesi3mages and cites 78-27-44 U.C.A. (1953, as amended), as controlling authority.

xal

A.

Statute Not Effective at Time of Accident
Section 78-27-44 U.C.A. (1953), which authorizes the Court to assess interest

tries

:tt 8% per annum on special damages, was not enacted until 1975 and the accident in
the subject case oc~e_;l in_~9I_4.

Tirus, Appellant ~d have the Court apply law

l!J iffiich was not even in effect at the time of the accident. The general rule is that

~~egislative enactments operate prospectively rather than retrospectively, unless

,pule

orUfKPressly declared otherwise. In re Ingraham's Estate, 148 P2d 340 (Utah, 1944).
lain
As the Utah Supreme Court noted in ~Carrey v. Utah State Teachers Retirenent

-5-
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~

Boani, et al., 177 P2d 725 (Utah, 1947),

!:

Ordinarily, legislative enactments are intended to operate prospectively and not retrospectively. As said in SO Pm. Jur. 494 Statutes · a
Section 478: '"lhe question whether a statute operates retrosp~ctively, '
or pr<;>spectively only, is one of legislative intent. In detennin:ing
i
such mtent, the courts have evolved a strict rule of construction
against a retrospective operation, and indulge in the prestmq:ltion that
the legislature intended statutes, or amendments thereof, enacted by
it to operate prospectively only, and not retroactively. Indeed, the
j
general rule is that they are to be so construed, where they are susceptible of such interpretation and the intention of the legislature can
C
be. satisfied ~eby, where such interpretation does not produce results d1
which the legi.slature may be presumed not to have intended, and where the
intention of the legislature to make the statute retroactive is not state
in express terms, or clearly, explicitly, positively, unequivocally,
c1
urmistakably, and \.D:l.Blllbiguously shown by necessary implication or terms
which permit no other meaning to be annexed to them, preclude all questio cc
in.regard thereto, and leave no reasonable doubt thereof. Ordinarily, m
intention to give a statute a retroactive operation will not be inferred.
If it is doubtful whether the statute or amendment was intended to operat
retrospectively, the doubt 'WOUld be resolved against such operation. (AI SJ

726).
Section 78-27-44 does not state that it acts retrospectively, therefore;
acts prospectively.

Since the statute was not in effect at the tirre of the

81

the court ~ no statutory reason to differentiate between general and specii
B.

Statute D:les Not Require Court to Separate Special And General !larnag
Section 78-27-44 provides as follows:

Personal injury judgments--Interest authorized--In all actions
brought to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by any person
resulting frcm or occassioned by the tort of any other person, corporati
association or partnership, whether by negligence or willful intent of t
person, corporation, association, or partnership, and whether that injur
shall have resulted fatally or otherwise, it shall be lawful for the
Plaintiff in the Complaint to claim interest on the special damages alle tl
frcm the date of the occurrence of the act giving rise to the cause of a
and it shall be the duty of the court, in entering judgJ.rent for Plaintil II
that action to add to the an:ount of damages assessed by the verdict oft
jury, or found by the court, interest on that arrour:t. calctp.ated at 8% p£ al
annum from the date of the occurrence of the act g~vmg r~se to the caw
action to the date of entering the judgment, and to include it in that ;

ment.
Section 78-27-44 does not state that Courts are required to differential
tween special and general damages on special verdict fonns.

Prior to the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may
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e!1i

the statute :in 1975, it was not even necessary to differentiate.

However, for

~tes accidents occurring after enactment of the statute, when such a differentiation
I

·Y' . is made, the Court shall access :interest on special damages.

lt

It is, of course, impossible noW to know just what eleiEl.ts of damage the
jury did consider :in making its award.

Any one of a number of possibilities are

~ep- conceivable :in arriving at the figure the jury awarded Pla:intiff, :including special

~: damages

or a combination of special and general damages.

The entire anxrunt of the

>tate chiropractors bill was questionable as a necessary medical expense and it is quite
~io conceivable that the jury could have awarded that anxrunt solely as general damages.

The jury was certainly instructed to consider an award for both general and
rr ,
P(~ special damages. Instruction 4/20 to the jury, :in part, reads:

'f ,eel&

orei

he81

ecii

!I' SOD

•rati
oft
njur

Pa:in and suffering have no market value. They are not capable of
being exactly and accurately determined, and there is no fixed rule or
standard whereby damages for them can be measured. The award for pa:in
and suffering uust be limited to canpensation. Compensation :in this
cormection is to be lmderstood as describing an allowance looking toward
recompense for or made because of suffering resulting from the :injury.
You are to consider as special damages that aroount reasonably and
necessarily expended for doctors, drugs, traveling costs, telephone bills,
and other expenses paid or sustained by Pla:intiff as a proximate result
of the collision of February 2, 1974, not to exceed $2,596.42.
General damages are to compensate for the bodily :injuries, including
pa:in and suffering, loss of future earnings and medical expenses subsequent to the date of the :injuries. You may consider as part of general
damages aroounts reasonably necessary for future medical treatment and
expense, as well as loss of future earnings, if any, you find.
Instructions 4/19 and 23 also address the issue of awarding damages and nothing

alle therein could confuse the jury into believing they should only award special damages.
of e
:ntif In clear and concise language, the jury was informed that they could make any reason-

cit
1% P' able award.

caw

.
This they did in the space for damages on the special verdict form.

lat ~

1tiat

POINT III
1llE ASSESSING OF INTEREST IS NOr AUTHORIZED ON
APPEUANI' Is SPECIAL DAMAGES

Appellant claims the trial court should be required to assess interest on her
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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special damages at the rate of 8% per annum, in accordance with §78-27 -44

u.

(1953, as amended) .
Section 78-27-44, U.C.A. (1953), quoted in the previous section, does

~r'

the assessing of interest at the rate of 8% per annum on the 811D\IDt of special o

assessed by the verdict of the jury from the time the cause of action accrues, m
as has been noted, there was no differentiation between special and general eli

..-

on the Special Verdict Fonn and therefore-# it is impossible to know precisely
<

---

·--"-n-

Bl

¥•-

~t the jury considered to be s~~~~.§.

a

Also, as has been noted, §78-27-44 U.C.A. (1953) was not enacted into 1a e<

1975.

The cause of action in the instant case occurred in 1974.

The general

Bl

is that legislative enactments operate prospectively rather than retrospecti~M
unless expressly declared otherwise.

In re Ingraham's Estate, 148 P2d 340 0 r<
~::_-,~--:.....=----=-

F:

1944), supra.

e Il

Since Section 78-27-44 does not state that it acts retrospectively, it

fore acts ~ospectively, and Appellant is to be precluded from claiming any i! UJ
on her special damages, whatever those special damages might be.
POINT IV

AWARDING OF SPECIAL DAMAGES WITHOUT GENERAL DAMAGES
IS WI' INADEQUATE AS A MATTER OF LAW

d

Assuming that the jury award of $2,596.42 was for special damages only,

question arises as to whether the verdict was inadequate as a matter of law o
insufficient.
In both Calm v. J. C. Permey Company, Inc., 537 P2d 306 (Utah, 1975) ani
. rr

v. International Transport, Inc., 491 PZd 1211 (Utah, 1971) the respective J'
returned verdicts for the exact amount of Plaintiff's claimed special damag~

81
lD

no general damages.

The verdict fonns in Com and Langton did, however, diff

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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u.

instant case in that they provided separate spaces for the awarding of both
general and special damages, but the Court, while holding that the verdicts, as

s autrendered by the juries, were defective in form, nevertheless, allowed the verdicts

ecial to stand.

The verdicts were regarded as "insufficient", but not inadequate as a

rues, matter of law.

d!

al

~ly

In Bliss v. Colanan, 522 P2d 509 (Washington App., 1974), Plaintiff brought
an action for injuries sustained in an autOI!Dbile accident.

The trial court directed

a verdict as to Defendant's liability and submitted only the issues of proximate

0

1a cause and damages to the jury.

The jury returned a verdict for Plaintiffs in the

eral anmmt of $519.92, the exact am:n.mt of Pla:intiff's special damges.

Plaintiff's

cti\1 MJtion for a new trial was granted solely on the inadequacy-of damages.

40

O requested

Defendants

the Court to utilize an additur, but the trial court refused to do so.

From the order granting a new trial on the issue of damages, the Defendant appealed.
it

r In reversing

the judgment of the trial court granting Pla:intiffs a new trial solely

ny ± upon the issue of damages, the Washington Appeals Court held that, ''The jury verdict

----

for the exact am:n.mt of special damages is not inadequate as a
(At 510) .

mat7~

of law."

Because the jury verdict was supported by substantial evidence in the

record, the court said that the granting of a new trial was a manifest abuse of
discretion.
ly,

awe

Such is the case :in the :instant matter.
POINI' V

1HE AWARD OF DAMAGES WERE NOr INADEQUATE NOR WAS 1HE
VERDICT GIVEN UNDER 1HE INFIJJENCE OF PASSION OR PREJUDICE

Appellant seeks to have the j~t of the trial court vacated and the matter
. remmded for a new trial based primarily upon Appellant's contention that the damages
·e Jt
awarded to Appellant were inadequate or insufficient and that the verdict was given
agel

diff under the influence of passion or prejudice.
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Rule 59(a) (5) atates that a""" trial may be g<anted """"" the -dkt

l

(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given
under the influence of passion or prejudice.
(
Appellant seeks a new trial on the issue of inadequate damages and the ir(
of passion or prejudice.
A.

of

New Trial on Basis of Inaciequate I?amages

In addressing the issue of granting new trials, the Utah SupraiE Cou tl

set forth the general rule, in Brunson v. Strong, 412 P2d 451 (Utah, 1966), ~tj

Sl
When both sides have been given an opportunity to present their
evidence and contentions to a jury, and a verdict has been rendered,
m::
all presurptions support its validity. Consequently, it I!D.lSt stand
mU.ess the Appellant show that error was comnitted which had such an
adverse effect upon the trial that there is a reasonable likelihood
that the result would have been different in its absence. (At 453-54).

In Bnmson, supra, Plaintiff sued to recover for personal injur-ies and 1ir

damages resulting ficm a collision between her car and one driven by the Defe Sc
A jury returned a verdict for car repairs, $414.00; and for personal
$515.00 special and $1, 000. 00 general damages.

injur-ie~

of

Plaintiff rroved for a new tri

the grmmd that the award of general damages was grossly inadequate; and upor
denial, she appealed.

The Court said:

We do not question the sincerity of Plaintiff's belief that the
award of only $1,000.00 is inadequate compensation for the injury she
claims to have suffered to her back. But it is something about which
there is room for a difference of opinion. >'< * It is hard to tell
on any objective basis to what extent this accident may have aggravated
her difficulty. This determination must rest largely upon her test:irron
Its evaluation and the conclusion to be drawn therefrom is peculiarly
within the province of the jury. Due to its acknowledged prerogatives,
its advantaged position, and the desirability of safeguarding the inte·
grity of the jury system, the courts are and should be reluctant to
interfere with a jur-y verdict and will not do so as long as there is
any reasonable basis in the evidence to justify it. Brunson v. Strong,
412 P2d at 453.

re
li
~

he
cc
ir

tr

See Gilliespie v. Dejong, 520 P2d 878,880 (1974); Robinson v. Hreinson, re
121, 125 (1965); See also Beyner v. Continental Dry Cleaners, 548 P2d 898,'
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.t

l

v. Willis, 410 P2d 1003, 1005 (1966) ' llaleo v. Peter,.,, 360 P2d 822, 824-25

·en (1961); Sprunt v. Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad Company, 340 P2d 85, 88

ir(l959).

Le

The setting aside of a verdict for inadequacy rests primarily in the discretion
of the trial court, and its action in granting or refusing to grant a new ttial on
Cou the grmmd of inadequacy will not be disturbed on appeal unless an abuse of discrel , ~ tion is shown.

Generally, a verdict will not be disturbed merely on account of the

smallness of the damages awarded or because the reviewing court would have awarded
(22 Am. Jur. 2d, Damages §398).

more.
B.

4).

Influence of Passion or Prejudice
To support her claim of inadequate damages, Appellant claims the jury was

nd P influenced by passion or prejudice.

Such a claim is made on the basis of a conver-

DefE sation cmmsel for Appellant overheard between

b.ID

or three jurors and on the basis

de of the instructions to the jury.

rtr.

l.

upa

The conversation reported by cmmsel for Appellant occurred in the men's

Overheard Jurors 1 Conversation

restroom and involves one juror asking another juror, "I wonder where those
little girls insurance companies are?"

1e
:h

b.ID

and the second juror responding "Yes, you

wuld certainly think if they had insurance, their insurance ccxrpanies wmld be

1ted here to defend them."

(Affidavit of Craig M. Snyder, P. 2.)

As a result of this

irron

ly

conversation, Appellant claims "the jury was influenced by passion or prejudice

ves,
:~.te· in that they did not believe that the Defendants were covered by insurance, and

s

thus, lessened the arrount of their reward."

~'

(Appellant 1 s Brief, P. 14-15).

The problem with this contention is that the Appellant has the legal theory

~' regarding the subject of insurance just backwards:

8,

Courts do not wish juries to

c
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know whether Defendants have insurance so that juries will not be overgenerouJ

the awarding of damages.

In Hill v. Cloward, 377 P2d 186 (Utah, 1962), the Q

a

said, in referring to the subject of insurance:

t1

. . • when this admittedly touchy subject is referred to, and
the jury suspects that it is not the Defendant, but an insurance company who will pay any verdict, it is apt to deal lightly with disputed
issues of fact and to be overgenerous in awarding damages. (At 187)

o

"It hardly seems necessary to state that the matter of insurance is quit t

material to issues as to liability and damages, or aiiD\ID.t thereof." Hill V. 1 "

supra, 577 P2d at 187; see Robinson v. Hrienson, 409 P2d 121, 123 (Utah, 1965 !J
Owens Trucking Corporation v. Stewart, 509 P2d 821, 822-23 (Utah, 1973).

Respondent's counsel did. not do or say anything regarding the subject of f
nor should he have.

In considering the overheard conversation, one must bear n

that jurors certainly are quite free to "WOnder about any number of possible t t<
i

including insurance policies, companies, and attomeys.
The only two conclusions that can be made from the overheard conversatio

that:

e

At least two jurors do not know what an attomey for an insurana

(1)

pany looks like, and (2)

'1\.io jurors did not know whether the Defendants had

t
p

ance.

Such a position is entirely consistent with the position in which cour
j

jurors to be:

to wit, tminfomed as to whether insurance is involved or not
c

2.

Jury Instructions

Appellant also claims that due to the repetition of certain languai
the Court placed 1.mdue emphasis on Defendant's position to the prejudice of'
In illustration of the alleged undue emphasis, Appellant exerpts from five o: rr
twenty-eight instructions to the jury.

When the five exerpts are read in

S1J t

they do appear to be repetitious, but when they are read in their entirety, ~
numerical sequence, as they were read to the jury, any repetition eludes the
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'

In instructing a jury, a Cburt is in a position of having to explain legal terms

e Q and concepts to people not intimately acquainted with such terms and concepts.

In

the instant case, the Appellant complains of the "tmdue emphasis placed upon Appellant and her burden of proof" in Jury Instructions 11, 12, 13, 18, and 19.
d

Reading

of the specific instructions in their entirety reveals an explanation of a legal
. term and its concept:

lUlb

V.I

Instruction

41ll explains that the burden of proof requires

"a preponderance of the evidence" and then defines "a preponderance of the evidence."

_ Instruction 4112 explains that a verdict is not to be based on speculation or conjec965
ture. Instruction 4113 explains that to find for the Plaintiff the jury llllSt find,
: of

from a preponderance of the evidence, that the Defendants were negligent and their
negligence was the proximate cause of the accident.

Instruction 4118 asks the jury

Jeai

let

to consider all the evidence, regardless of who produced it.

And, Instruction

4119

instructs the jury to award damages, if any, in an am:runt in accordance with the

atio

evidence.
Such instructions are hardly repetitious.

had

Rather, they inform the jury as

to the law as it is applicable to the facts of the case.

This was an action for

personal injuries for which damages were sought and as such, it demanded that the

COUI

jury be instructed on the points of ''burden of proof".

This, the Court did in a

not

clear and thorough manner.

lgll8!

of'

CONCLUSION

The jury system is necessarily grOLIDded upon the sOLIDd premise that, for the

reo: liDSt part, jurors take their responsibilities seriously, that they attempt to judge

1 S1J

the rights of their fellow citizens fairly and to appraise damages honestly.

:y, v. Hrienson, 409 P2d 121, 124 (Utah, 1965).
the
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Robinson

That is mt to say that juri<S do not moke mi•take• or that verdicts
be reviewed by appeal courts.

J

But when the parties appear to have had a full:

fair opportunity to present their contentions and the evidence supporting tha!s

'11

the court and jury, and to have a verdict and judgment entered thereon, then a

an

SUIIlptions are in favor of the validity of the verdict and judgment.

Unless tll<e

substantial and prejudicial error absent, which there is a reasonable likelih
that there VJOUld have been a different result, the UU:lh Supreme Court has sta1
will not disturb those judgments.

Gillespie v. Delong, 520 P2d 878, 880 (Uta

Appellant has not shown that an error was cO!llllitted which had such an ad
effect upon the trial that there is a reasonable likelihood that the result
have been different in its absence.

The parties in the instant case have had

and fair opportunity to present their case.

Therefore, it is respectfully su

to this Court that Appellant's Appeal should be denied.
DAlEO this

S

w

day of Jtme, 1978.
Respectfully submitted,
IDRGAN, SCALLEY, UJNl' & KIMBLE

~=~
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent
345 South State Street, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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I hereby certify that I mailed tYX> copies of the foregoing Brief to Craig M.

ha!Snyder, Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant, 120 East 300 North, Provo, Utah, 84601,

en land tYX> copies to Jolm M. Chipman, Attorney for Third-Party Defendant-Respondent,

s tll<earns Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84101, this
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day of Jtm.e, 1978.
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